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Henigan: Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment

ARMS, ANARCHY AND THE SECOND
AMENDMENT*
DENNIS A. HENIGAN"

I. INTRODUCTION
An enduring feature of the contemporary debate over gun control is the
effort to give the debate a constitutional dimension. Opponents of strict
government regulation of private firearms invariably claim that regulation cannot
be reconciled with the Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."' This constitutional argument has been a
recurring theme of those in Congress opposed to a national waiting period for
handgun sales2 and of those opposed to restraints on private ownership of
military-style assault weapons. 3
While the Second Amendment has acquired significance as a source of
political rhetoric opposing gun control, it has been devoid of importance as a
constitutional barrier to gun control laws. Federal and state courts in this
century have reached a consensus interpretation of the Amendment that permits
government at all levels broad power to limit private access to firearms. The
nation's strictest gun control laws have been upheld against Second Amendment
challenge, 4 including a local ban on private possession of handguns.5

0 1991, Center To Prevent Handgun Violence. All Rights reserved.
Dennis Henigan is Director of the Legal Action Project at the Center To Prevent Handgun
Violence in Washington, D.C. The Legal Action Project has appeared as amlcus curiae in
constitutional litigation involving gun control laws, including Farmer v. Higgins and Fresno Rifle
& Pistol Club v. Van de Kamp, discussed in the text. The author gratefully acknowledges the
suggestions of Robert Vanderet of O'Melveny & Myers, and Judith Bonderman of the Legal Action
Project staff, as well as the editorial assistance of Jacqueline Sternberg of the Project's staff. The
responsibility for any errors or omissions is the author's alone.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. U.
2. See, e.g., 137 CONO. REC. H2823 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statements of Reps. Unseld
and Quillen).
3. See, e.g., 136 CONO. REc. S6743 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 136
CONG. REc. 56748-49 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
4. See, e.g., Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057 (D.C. 1987), cen. denied, 484 U.S.
868 (1987); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 (NJ. 1968), appealdismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969).
5. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
863 (1983). The Morton Grove ban included several exemptions, including police, the military,
licensed gun collectors and licensed gun clubs. 695 F.2d at 263-64, n.l.
-
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According to the judicial consensus, the scope of the people's right to keep
and bear arms is limited by the introductory phrase of the Amendment about the
necessity of a "well regulated Militia" to the "security of a free State." Over
fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Miller,6 that the
"obvious purpose" of the Amendment was "to assure the continuation and
render possible the effectiveness of.. ." the state militias and cautioned that the
Amendment "must be interpreted and applied with that end in view." 7 The
militia, composed of ordinary citizens, was seen by the Framers as a check on
the power of the federal standing army, composed of professional soldiers. As
the Court wrote in Miller, "[t]he sentiment of the time strongly disfavored
standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country and
laws could be secured through the Militia -- civilians primarily, soldiers on
occasion.""

Following the Court's guidance, lower federal courts and state courts since
Miller have unanimously held that regulation of the private ownership of
firearms offends the Second Amendment only if it interferes with the arming of
the state militia.9

Since the Supreme Court also has held that the modem

6. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
7., Id. at 178.
8. Id. at 179.
9. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit wrote in United States v. Nelsen, 859
F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988), courts "have analyzed the Second Amendment purely in terms of
protecting state militias, rather than individual tights." The lower court decisions endorsing the
militia interpretation include Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 66-67, n.2 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976);
United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Day, 476 F.2d 562,
568 (6th Cir. 1973); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 36-37 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1010 (1972); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v.
McCutcheon, 446 F.2d 133, 135-36 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134, 1136
(5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds,
319 U.S. 463 (1943); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922-23 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied
sub nom Velazquez v. United States, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v.
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 210 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Thompsonv. Dereta, 549
F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Utah 1982); Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057 (D.C. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 868 (1987); Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Il. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1976); In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396,
398, n.l (Minn. 1980); State v. Fennell, 382 S.E.2d 231, 232 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Harris v.
State, 432 P.2d 929, 930 (Nev. 1967); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 525-29 (N.J. 1968), appeal
dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969); City of East Cleveland v. Scales, 460 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (Ohio
App. 1983); Masters v. State, 653 S.W.2d 944 (rex. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677,
679 (Utah 1982).
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embodiment of the "well regulated militia" is the National Guard,"0 which does
not use privately owned guns at all, gun control laws are regularly upheld.
In recent years, various articles have appeared in academic journals which
offer an interpretation of the Amendment quite at odds with the consensus
judicial view." These writers contend that the right to keep and bear arms can
be a broad personal right of all citizens even ifit is tied to the necessity for a
militia.' 2 This claim rests upon two distinct, but related, theses: (1) that the
constitutionally protected "militia" is not an organized military force of the

10. See Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41,46 (1965) ("The National Guard isthe modem
Militia . . . ."); Perpich v. Department of Defense, 110 S. Ct. 2418, 2426 (1990).
("Notwithstanding the brief periods of federal service, the members of the state Guard unit continue
to satisfy [the] description of a militia.") In Perpich, the Court held that Congress may authorize
the President to order members of the state National Guard to engage in training exercises outside
the United States without the governor's consent or a declaration of a national emergency. Such
power, the Court determined, "is not inconsistent with the Militia Clauses. . ." of the Constitution,
which divide authority over the militia between the state and federal government. 110 S. Ct. at
2430. See discussion infra at 8-9. That the Court analyzed the issue before it under the Militia
Clauses itself establishes that it regards the National Guard as the modem militia. Perpich is
especially interesting because the Court had before it an amicus brief filed by the "Firearms Civil
Rights Legal Defense Fund," an arm of the National Rifle Association, urging it to find that the
National Guard is not the militia, but rather is a component of the U.S. Army. Brief of Amicus
Curiae Firearms Civil Rights Legal Defense Fund in Support of Appellees, Perpich (No. 89-542)
(on file with author).
11. See e.g., Sanford Levinson, 7he Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637
(1989) [hereinafter Levinson]; Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the
Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1987); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen
Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 559
(1986) [hereinafter Hardy]; Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of
the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983) [hereinafter Kates]; Stephen P. Halbrook,
To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-1791, 10 N.
KY. L. REV. 13 (1982) [hereinafter Halbrook].
12. These articles also typically contend that the right to keep and bear arms is not qualified
or limited by the reference to the militia, and thereby assert a right to be armed for other purposes,
such as personal self-defense. This claim is flatly contradicted by the Supreme Court's opinion in
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). The issue in Miller was whether the Second
Amendment barred the prosecution of two individuals for transporting in interstate commerce a
sawed-off shotgun without first registering the weapon as required by the National Firearms Act of
1934. The Court refused to hold that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear
the gun because no showing had been made that it "has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." Id. at 178. The Court declined to take
judicial notice that "this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could
contribute to the common defense." Id. Thus, the Court saw the issue as turning entirely on the
connection between possession of the weapon and the viability of the militia. At no point did the
Court even raise the question whether a sawed-off shotgun could have a legitimate non-military use,
such as self-defense. For a historical defense of the view that the concern of the Second Amendment
is solely the distribution of military power between the states and the federal government, see Keith
A. Ehrman and Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You
Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989) [hereinafter Ehrman and Henigan].
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states, but is rather the armed citizenry at large; and (2) that the right of the
people to keep and bear arms was intended by the Framers as a fundamental
check on the power of both state and federal government, by ensuring the means
for armed resistance to tyranny.
In defense of the consensus judicial interpretation, this essay contends that
the alternative view of the Second Amendment is contradicted by the text of the
Constitution itself, as well as by key historical materials bearing on the original
intent of the Framers. In addition, this discussion will expose the implications
of the alternative view for the fundamental relationship between citizens and
their government. As explained below, the alternative view amounts to the
startling assertion of a generalized constitutional right of all citizens to engage
in armed insurrection against their government. This "insurrectionist theory"
of the Second Amendment, in the judgment of this writer, represents a
profoundly dangerous doctrine of unrestrained individual rights which, if
adopted by the courts, would threaten the rule of law itself.
II. THE INSURRECTIONIST THEORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT

Professor Sanford Levinson's article The Embarrassing Second
Amendment' 3 will be used here as representative of the articles advancing one
form or another of the insurrectionist theory. Levinson's essay has been chosen
both because its arguments (and supporting material) are typical of the genre and
because it has received far more attention than other similar articles, particularly
from the popular press.' 4
G
The selection of Levinson's piece as a foil should acknowledge his own
disclaimer that it is not his "style to offer 'correct' or 'incorrect' interpretations
of the Constitution.""5 Nevertheless, it clearly is his purpose to convince those
inclined to give a broad reading to other guarantees in the Bill of Rights to

seriously consider a similarly broad view of the right to keep and bear arms."6
13. See Levinson, supra note 11.
14. Richard Bernstein, The Right to BearAms: A Wor*ing Definition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1990, at 6E; Michael Kinsley, Second Thoughts, THE NEW REPUBUC, Feb. 26, 1990, at 4; George
F. Will, America's Crisis of Gunfire, THE WASHINGTON POST, March 21, 1991, at A21.
15. Levinson, supra note 11, at 642. In light of this statement, Levinson may be surprised to
learn of the use of his article by anti-gun control partisans. His article, along with others advocating
the insurrectionist theory, is cited by the National Rifle Association (NRA) in proclaiming "Victory
in the Law Journals" for the NRA's view that the Second Amendment guaranteesa broad, individual
right to own guns. See 5 NRA ACTION No. 10, at 7 (Oct. 19, 1991).

16. The title of Levinson's piece expresses his view that the Second Amendment "may be
profoundly embarrassing to many who both support [prohibitory] regulation [of firearms] and view
themselves as committed to zealous adherence to the Bill of Rights ... . Levinson, supra note
11, at 642.
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In this writer's view, Levinson pursues this purpose by manipulating his
supporting material so as to exclude that which would cast doubt on the
existence of a broad, individual right.' 7 As a result, the Levinson essay is
certainly fair game for criticism, in spite of its effort to avoid the appearance of
dogma.
The two central theses of the insurrectionist theory are stated throughout
the Levinson piece. About the meaning of the "militia," Levinson recommends
that "we should make some effort to find out what the term 'militia' meant to
eighteenth century readers and writers, rather than assume that it refers only to
Dan Quayle's Indiana National Guard and the like." 8 He then concludes that
"[tihere is strong evidence that 'militia' refers to all of the people, or at least all
of those treated as full citizens of the community." 9 As to the ultimate
constitutional importance of the armed citizenry, Levinson relies on the theory
of checks and balances:
[Olne aspect of the structure of checks and balances within the
purview of 18th century thought was the armed citizen. That is, those
who would limit the meaning of the Second Amendment to the
constitutional protection of state-controlled militias agree that such
protection rests on the perception that militarily competent states were
viewed as potential protection against a tyrannical national government
... . But this argument assumes that there are only two basic
components in the vertical structure of the American polity -- the
national government and the states. It ignores the implication that
might be drawn from the Second, Ninth and Tenth Amendments: that
the citizenry itself can be viewed as an important third component of
republican governance insofar as it stands ready to defend republican
liberty against the depredations of the other two structures, however
futile that might appear as a practical matter.2°

17. One conspicuous example of Levinson's manipulation is his discussion of the existing law
review literature on the Second Amendment. Levinson, supra note 11, at 639, n.13. He cites
several law review articles, all of which are critical of the consensusjudicial interpretation, but omits
mention of the following articles which support it: Peter Feller and Karl Gotting, The Second
Amendment, A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REv.46 (1966); John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms:
The Development of the American Experience, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (1971); Ralph Rohner, The
Right to BearArms, 16 CATH. U. L. REv. 53 (1966); Roy Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed
Ctizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1972).
Levinson complains that most of the articles on the Second Amendment have been written by
lawyers, not academics, and yet two of the articles he omitted (John Levin and Ralph Rohner) were
written by law professors.
18. Levinson, supra note 11, at 646.
19. Id. at 646-47,
20. Id. at 651.
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Thus, in Levinson's words, it may be "a privilege and immunity of United
States citizenship' -- of membership in a liberty-enhancing political order -- to
keep arms that could be taken up against tyranny wherever found, including,
obviously, state government." 2'
In Levinson's theory, therefore, the
constitutional militia -- properly understood as the collection of armed citizens - is not an instrument of state government authority. The militia is rather a
potential revolutionary force poised to use violence against the excesses of
government at all levels.
Of course, the right to keep arms for that purpose would hardly be an
effective check on tyranny if the right did not also extend to the use of those
arms against a tyrannical government. To Levinson, an armed population is
constitutionally important because it creates the potential for armed uprising:
"[A] state facing a totally disarmed population is in a far better position, for
good or for ill, to suppress popular demonstrations and uprisings than is one that
must calculate the possibilities of its soldiers and officials being injured or
killed."'
What is really being asserted by Professor Levinson is a
constitutional right to engage in armed insurrection against tyrannical
governmental authority, whether state or federal.
III. THE INSURRECTIONIST THEORY AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE
CONsTrrUTION

The most obvious problem with Levinson's theory is reconciling it with the
language of the Second Amendment itself. By its words, the constitutional value
protected by the Amendment is "the security of a free State." Presumably, the
term "free State" is a reference to the states as entities of governmental
authority. Moreover, the reference to the "security" of a free State must have
something to do with the need to defend the state as an entity of government.
How, then, can the Amendment that purports to express distrust of state
governmental power, and to create a right to be armed against abuses of that
power, also elevate the defense of state government to a constitutionally
protected value?'
The inclusion of this phrase in the Second Amendment

21. Id.
22. Levinson, supra note 11, at 657.
23. The Second Amendment is, of course, the only provision in the Bill of Rights proclaiming
"the security of a free State" as its object. This is surely relevant to the issue whether the Second
Amendment should be regarded as "incorporated" through the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation
on the states. Levinson, supra note 11, at 652-53, correctly notes that although the nineteenth
century Supreme Court decisions on the Second Amendment, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 553 (1875) and Presser v. Ilinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), found the Amendment to be a limit
on only the federal government, these cases were decided during an era when the entire Bill of
Rights was held inapplicable to the states. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
Levinson argues that these decisions should be reconsidered in light of the modern "selective
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makes Levinson's theory immediately implausible. Nowhere in Levinson's
analysis does he offer an explanation of its meaning that is consistent with the
insurrectionist theory.
The words of the Amendment also pose a problem for Levinson's view that
the term "militia" as used in the Amendment refers simply to the collection of
citizens who are armed. The insurrectionist theory has difficulty accounting for
the modifier "well regulated" which precedes "militia." In what sense is the
"militia," as defined by Levinson, "well regulated"? The use of "well
regulated" in the Amendment certainly implies that the militia is subject to a set
of legal rules and obligations, which suggests that the militia is an organized
military force, not an ad hoc group of armed individuals.
The meaning of "well regulated" is illuminated by examining the nature of
the militia as it existed in colonial times. It is true that the membership of the
militia of the several states was broad-based; it generally consisted of white
males between the ages of eighteen to forty-five or sixty years. 4 However,

incorporation" doctrine, but never addresses the unique implications of the Second Amendment's
language. If the security of state government is the object of the people's right to be armed, would
it not be paradoxical to apply the Amendment to limit the power of state government? At the very
least, it is illogical to argue that the Second Amendment should be applied to the states by the same
reasoning that has led the Supreme Court to incorporate other provisions of the Bill of Rights that
do not expressly protect the security of the states. It remains the law of the land that the Second
Amendment does not apply to the states, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1964), and therefore
is no restraint on state regulation of firearms. See, e.g., Justice v. Elrod, 832 F.2d 1048, 1051 (7th
Cir. 1987); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied
sub nom. Velazquez v. United States, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van
de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415, 1419 (E.D. Cal. 1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-15466 (9th Cir.);
Krisko v. Oswald, 655 F. Supp. 147, 149 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57,
71 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affid in part and rev'd in part and remanded in part, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir.
1982); Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 329 F. Supp. 845, 846 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affid, 477 F.2d 610
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973); Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 692 (Ind.
1990); State v. Swanton, 629 P.2d 98, 99 (Ariz. App. 1981); State v. Amos, 343 So. 2d 166, 168
(La. 1977); Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1976); Application of Atkinson,
291 N.W.2d 396, 398 n.l (Minn. 1980); Harris v. State, 432 P.2d 929, 930 (Nev. 1967); State v.
Sanne, 364 A.2d 630 (N.H. 1976); State v. Goodno, 511 A.2d 456, 457 (Me. 1986); Masters v.
State, 685 S.W.2d 654, 655 (rex. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 853 (1985).
24. WILLIAM RIKER, SOLDIERS OF THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12 (1957) [hereinafter RIKER]. Levinson's claim that "militia" refers to
"all of the people, or at least all of those treated as full citizens of the community" (Levinson, supra
note 11, at 646-47) does not appear to be historically accurate. Older white males were certainly
considered citizens and yet were exempt from militia service. The restriction of membership to a
defined age group supports the idea of the militia as a military force; membership was restricted to
those perceived by the colonial governments to be best able to engage in military activity. As the
Supreme Court noted in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179, (1939), "the Militia comprised
all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense ....-
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it is also true that, by virtue of their membership in the colonial militia, persons
were-subject to various legal requirements imposed by the colonial governments.
Colonial legislatures early on had enacted general draft laws modelled after the
English militia system.'
Militiamen "were required to muster for training,
usually four to eight days per year, two to four days in the spring (usually a
company parade), and two to four days in the autumn (usually a battalion
parade)."' They also were required to furnish their own equipment, including
muskets, powder and shot for the infantry, and horses for the cavalry. 27 Fines
were levied and collected for failure to attend musters and adequately maintain
equipment.'
Militia service away from one's home community also was
required, although it generally was limited in time." Although some classes
of persons were exempt from militia requirements (usually ministers and
teachers),' the existence of these specified exemptions itself underscores the
nature of the colonial militia as an organized military force subject to rules and
regulations imposed by colonial governments. As the Supreme Court wrote in
United States v. Miller, the militia was a "body of citizens enrolled for military
discipline. 3
A fundamental flaw in the insurrectionist theory is its confusion of the
membership of the colonial militia with the definition of the colonial militia.
Simply because the militia was composed of all white males of a certain age
group does not mean that the term "militia" as used by the Framers means all
white males of a certain age group. Rather, the colonial militia was an
organized military force governed by rules and regulations. It was, in short, a
form of compulsory military service imposed on much of the male population.
"White males between the ages of 18 and 45" does not define the colonial militia
any more than "nations of the world" defines the United Nations.32
The Second Amendment, however, is not the only provision of the
Constitution that addresses the militia. The nature of the militia, as understood
by the Framers, also is revealed by two clauses of Article I -- Clauses 15 and

25.
26.
27.
28.

RIKER, supra note 24, at 11.
Id.
Id.

LAWRENCE CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS:
SOCIETY TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 4 (1982).

THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA IN AMERICAN

29. Id.
30. RIKER, supra note 24, at 12.
31. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
32. Although the Militia Act of 1792 required every male citizen between the ages of eighteen
and forty-five to be enrolled in the militia and equip himself with specific military weaponry, 1 Stat.
271, this broad-based citizen militia proved over time to be unworkable. The evolution of the early
militia to the National Guard of today is briefly described in Perpich v. Department of Defense, 110
S. Ct. 2418, 2423 (1990). See also Ehrman and Henigan, supra note 12, at 34-39.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss1/14

Henigan: Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment

1991]

ARMS, ANARCHY, AND THE SECOND

115

16 of Section 8 - commonly known as the "Militia Clauses":
The Congress shall have Power...
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment
of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress. 3
It is transparent from these provisions that the Framers understood the
militia to be an instrumentof governmentalauthority. Clause 15 gives Congress
the power to call out the militia for various purposes. Clause 16 divides
authority over the militia between the federal government and the states, giving
Congress the power to organize, arm and discipline the militia while reserving
to the states the power to appoint its officers and to train it "according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress." Levinson's theory, however, is that the
militia is to function as a check on the power of government, both federal and
state, which must mean that the militia must exist apartfrom government. This
idea simply cannot be reconciled with the Militia Clauses, which are ignored in
Levinson's essay.
The insurrectionist theory also has difficulty explaining the function of the
militia as set forth in the Militia Clauses. How can the militia be a collection
of citizens with the constitutionally guaranteed right to engage in armed
resistance against their government if the Constitution itself grants Congress the
power to call out the militia "to execute the Laws of the Union [and] suppress
Insurrections.... "? The Constitution cannot view the militia both as a means
by which government can suppress insurrection and as an instrument for
insurrection against the government. It must be one or the other. The Militia
Clauses make clear which one it is.
Before leaving the text of the Constitution, one additional point is worth
noting. Given the self-evident importance to our constitutional scheme of an
individual right to engage in armed revolution, is it not curious that this right is
not more explicitly stated in the text? Whatever else may be said in defense of
the insurrectionist theory, surely it must be admitted that the Second Amendment
is hardly a model of clarity as a declaration of the right to overthrow the

33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16.
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government.
Yet other parts of the Constitutional text affirm, without
ambiguity, the power of the government to preserve itself against insurrection.
This is true not only in the Militia Clauses, but throughout the document. For
example, the crime of treason receives special treatment in the Constitution.
The entirety of Article III, Section 3, is devoted to defining the crime,
specifying the proof sufficient for a conviction and giving Congress the power
to declare its punishment.'
Treason also is, of course, listed as an
impeachable offense for federal officers." In addition, Article IV, Section 4,
requires the federal government, on request of a state, to defend the state
"against domestic Violence."'
According to the insurrectionist theory, the "right to keep and bear Arms"
is to be taken to create an individual right to engage in armed insurrection, even
though the Framers left intact various provisions which strongly affirm the
power of government to punish conduct disloyal to government and to preserve
order. Acceptance of the insurrectionist theory leaves us with a Constitution
very much at war with itself, a conclusion that suggests a profound weakness in
the theory itself.
Of course, it must be acknowledged that the Second Amendment did effect
some change in the Constitutional scheme; presumably the Framers did not
adopt the Bill of Rights in 1791 with the intent to leave things as they were in
1787. What, then, was the nature of the change brought about by the Second
Amendment? The answer is contained in various key historical materials, which
are themselves inconsistent with the insurrectionist theory.
IV. THE INSURRECTIONIST THEORY AND THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT

Following the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the
states began to debate the issue of ratification. A battle of pamphlets and
newspaper articles commenced between the Antifederalists, who opposed
ratification, and the Federalists, who supported it."7 The Bill of Rights was the
outgrowth of the Antifederalist critique.
One consistent Antifederalist theme was that the Constitution had created
an excessively powerful central authority, which would lead to the destruction
of the states. For example, the Antifederalists feared that the Militia Clauses of

34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
37. See I BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 468-69
(1971) [hereinafter B. SCHWARTZ].
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the Constitution had given the central government excessive control over the
state militia, which was regarded as the guardian of the states' integrity. Luther
Martin stated the argument before the Maryland legislature:
[Through] this extraordinary provision, by which the militia, the only
defence and protection which the State can have for the security of
their rights against arbitrary encroachments of the general government,
is taken entirely out of the power of the respective States, and placed
under the power of Congress ....
It was urged [at the Constitutional
convention] that, if after having retained to the general government the
great powers already granted, and among those, that of raising and
keeping up regular troops, without limitations, the power over the
Militia should be taken away from the States, and also given to the
general government, it ought to be considered as the last coup de
grace to the State governments; that it must be the most convincing
proof, the advocates of this system design the destruction of the State
governments, and that no professions to the contrary ought to be
trusted; and that every State in the Union ought to reject such a system
with indignation, since, if the general government should attempt to
oppress and enslave them, they could not have any possible means of
self-defense... and, by placing the militia under [Congress'] power,
enable it to leave the militia totally unorganized, undisciplined, and
even to disarm them ....
Implicit in this argument is the idea that the militia was an instrument of state
government. Martin's argument was not that the Constitution deprived the
people of a right to be armed against the power of state and federal government,
but rather that it gave the federal government excessive power over the military
force which state governments relied upon for their security.
Of particular interest on this issue are the debates in the Virginia ratification
convention, both because this was the convention in which the militia issue was
most extensively discussed and because it no doubt had a profound influence on
the Virginian James Madison, who authored the Second Amendment. The
Virginia debate is replete with expressions of fear that federal control over the
militias would destroy them.
George Mason argued that the power given Congress to "organize, arm and
discipline" the militia would allow Congress to destroy the militia by "rendering
them useless -- by disarming them . . . Congress may neglect to provide for
arming and disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for

38. 3 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 208-09 (Max Farrand ed., 1974).
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Congress has an exclusive right to arm them.... ."" Patrick Henry also was
concerned about the arming of the state militia. He stated that "necessary as it
is to have arms, and though our Assembly has, by a succession of laws for
many years, endeavored to have the militia completely armed, it is still far from
being the case. When this power is given up to Congress . . . how will your
militia be armed?" 4'
Mason and Henry proposed that, "if Congress should
refuse to find arms for [the militia], this country may lay out their own money
to purchase them." 4' Federalist James Madison countered this argument by
maintaining that the Congressional power to arm the militia was not exclusive,
and thus Congress lacked the power to paralyze the state militia.' Similarly,
John Marshall asked: "If Congress neglect our militia, we can arm them
ourselves. Cannot Virginia import arms? Cannot she put them into the hands
of her militia-men?" 0 Significantly, there is not a word in the Virginia debates
about the need to ensure that the people are armed to ensure the potential for
revolution against state or federal governmental excesses.
These speakers took it for granted that the arming of the militia was a
governmental function; the issue being debated is the need to affirm the states'
concurrent power with the federal government to furnish arms to the militia."
It is difficult for the insurrectionist theory to account for this debate at all. If
the militia is simply the collection of citizens with their own arms, why all the
concern about whether the central government's power to arm the militia is
exclusive, or rather concurrent with the states' power? More fundamentally, if
the function of the militia is to check the excesses of state and federal
government by ensuring the potential for armed revolt by the people, how could
the militia also be dependent on those same governments for its arms?
The Virginia debates, ignored in Levinson's account, make it clear that the

39. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION
AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 379 (1836) [hereinafter J. ELLIOT].
40. Id. at 386.
41. 2 B. SCHwART, supra note 37, at 831.
42. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 39, at 382-83.
43. Id. at 421.

44. Even though colonial militiamen were generally expected to supply their own arms for
militia service, there is little doubt that these privately-owned weapons were supplemented by stateprovided arms. The Articles of Confederation had provided that "every State shall always keep a
well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered, and shall provide and have
constantly ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper
quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage." (Quowed in John K. Mahon, THE AMERICAN
MILITIA, DECADE OF DECISION, 1789-1800, at 4 (U. Fla. Monographs, Spring 1960) (emphasis
added)). This provision suggests that some militia arms were regarded as public property. It also
underscores the colonial understanding of the militia as a military force maintained by the states, a
concept totally alien to the insurrectionist view of the militia.
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Second Amendment arose from a concern by the Antifederalists that the
Constitution had made the existence of an armed militia a matter of federal
preference, rather than a right of the people of the several states. The purpose
of the Amendment was to affirm the people's right to keep and bear arms as a
state militia, against the possibility of the federal government's hostility, or
apathy, toward the militia.
Levinson's review of the historical material places heavy reliance on
quotations by certain historical figures and early Constitutional commentators
extolling the importance of the armed individual to the defense of liberty.
However, scrutinizing the most dramatic of these quotations reveals that
Levinson is able to use them to support his argument only by stripping away
their context. Once the context is restored, they turn out not to support the
insurrectionist theory, but to defeat it.
One example is Levinson's use of Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States.45 Levinson lifts the following quotation
from Story:
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been
considered as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it
offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power
of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first
instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them.'
Levinson omits the sentences which immediately follow:
And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of
a well regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be
disguised that, among the American people, there is a growing
indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong
disposition, from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all regulations.
How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed, without some
organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small danger
that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and
thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of

45. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1833)
[hereinafter STORY].
46. Id. at 677. This quotation is relied upon by other insurrectionist theorists, see Kates, supra
note 11, at 242 and Hardy, supra note 11, at 614, and is prominently featured in the literature of
the National Rifle Association. See, e.g., NRA INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, 7he Right
to Keep and Bear Arms...An Analysis of the Second Amendment 9 (1985).
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our national bill of rights.4
What was the protection intended by the Second Amendment? Levinson also
omits the footnote to the above quoted passage, which contains the following
passage from Tacitus: "Is there any escape from a large standing army, but in
a well-disciplined militia?"'
Story believed the armed citizenry to be essential to liberty only insofar as
it was subject to "a system of militia discipline." To the extent that the people
were armed "without some organization" or "rid of all regulations," he saw the
Second Amendment as unable to accomplish its purpose to protect liberty against
the power of the standing army. Presumably, the regulations he was referring
to were those imposed on the early militia by state governmental authority.
Story's discussion therefore is consistent with the theory that the Second
Amendment guarantees a right of the people to be armed only in service to an
organized militia. If he saw the armed citizenry per se as the protector of
liberty (the foundation of the insurrectionist theory), why would he express such
dismay at the people's lack of enthusiasm for militia discipline? Moreover,
Levinson himself quotes Story's reference to the militia as the natural defense
"against. . . domestic insurrections," which is itself inconsistent with the notion
that the militia is the armed citizenry poised to engage in domestic insurrection.
An even more telling instance of Levinson's omission of context is his use
of James Madison's FederalistNo. 46, which speaks of "the advantage of being
armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other
nation. " 9 This statement appears in the following passage concerning the
dangers of a standing army, which must be quoted at length to understand
Madison's meaning:
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be
formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal
government: still it would not be going too far to say that the State
governments with the people on their side would be able to repel the
danger. The highest number to which, according to the best
computation, a standing army can be carried in any country does not
exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one
twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion
would not yield, in the United States, any army of more than twentyfive or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia

47. STORY, supra note 45, at 678.
48. Id. at 678, n.2 (quoting TACITUS, HISTORIES IV, ch. 74).
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands,
officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their
common liberties and united and conducted by governments possessing
their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted whether a
militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a
proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the
late successful resistance of this country against the British arms will
be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage
of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of
almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments,
to which the people are attached and by which the militia officers are
appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more
insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can
admit of.'
The Federalist Madison is here arguing that the Constitution does not strip
the states of their militia, while conceding that a strong, armed militia is
necessary as a military counterpoint to the power of the regular standing army.
However, as the underscored language indicates, Madison saw the militia as the
military instrument of state government, not simply as a collection of
unorganized, privately armed citizens. Madison saw the armed citizen as
important to liberty to the extent that the citizen was part of a military force
organized by state governments, which possesses the people's "confidence and
affections" and "to which the people are attached.""' This is hardly an
argument for the right of people to be armed against government per se.- 2
This is not to deny that there may well have been some colonial thinkers
who believed in the right of individuals to be armed regardless of their
connection to an organized militia. There were, indeed, proposals for
constitutional language that would have guaranteed a broader right. For
instance, Levinson points to the amendment proposed by the New Hampshire
ratification convention: "Congress shall never disarm any citizen unless such

50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Alexander Hamilton also saw the militia as a means by which state government preserved
itself against popular insurrection. If the revolt be "a slight commotion in a small part of a State,
the militia of the residue would be adequate to its suppression; and the natural presumption is that
they would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause,
eventually endangers all government." THE FEDERAUST No. 28, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
52. The misuse of FEDERAusT No. 46 is typical of the other insurrectionist theorists. See,
e.g., Kates, supra note 11, at 228; Halbrook, supra note 11, at 16; Hardy, supra note 11, at 601-02.
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as are or have been in Actual Rebellion.'
It is surely significant that, even
though this formulation of the right was available to those who sought a Bill of
Rights, it did not find its way into the Constitution. Levinson also points to the
proposal of Sam Adams, guaranteeing to "peaceable citizens" the right of
"keeping their own arms."'" This proposal, however, was defeated by the
Massachusetts convention."
Finally, Levinson relies upon the text of 19th century constitutional
commentator Thomas Cooley.'
Levinson quotes from the Third Edition of
Cooley's treatise The General Principles of ConstitutionalLaw in the United
States of America, in which Cooley expressly objects to the idea that the Second
Amendment protects only the arms of those actually enrolled in the militia and
suggests a general right to form private armies; that is, to "meet for voluntary
discipline in arms..." for which the people "need no permission or regulation
of law for the purpose."5 7 Levinson, however, would have been well-advised

to read the Fourth Edition of Cooley's text. Although Cooley retains his view
on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms, he endorses the proposition that
the Second Amendment "is a limitation upon Congress and not upon the
legislatures of the several States. "m This addition was no doubt prompted by
the Supreme Court's ruling in Presser v. Illinois." Presser was cited in
Cooley's Fourth Edition, but omitted in the Third, even though it was decided
several years before the publication of the Third Edition. Indeed, Cooley's later
edition concludes that "the State could prohibit altogether the carrying or selling
of arms by private citizens. I This view, of course, is utterly inconsistent
with Levinson's suggestion that each individual may be guaranteed a right to be
armed against the excesses of state, as well as federal, government.
V.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSURRECTIONIST THEORY

As noted, Levinson suggests the possibility that the Second Amendment

53. Quoted in EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 182
(1957) and cited by Levinson, supra note 11, at 648. It should be noted that even this broad
formulation denied any right to use arms in rebellion against the government.
54. Quoted in Levinson, supra note 11, at 648.
55. BRANDFORD PIERCE AND CHARLES HALE, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE
CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 86-87 (1856), cited in, Martin C.
Ashman, Handgun Control by Local Government, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 97, 108 (1982).
56. Levinson, supra note II, at 649.
57. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA 298 (3d ed. 1898). This quotation also is relied upon by Hardy, supra note
11, at 64.
58. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 341 (4th ed. 1931) [hereinafter COOLEY].

59. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
60. COOLEY, supra note 58, at 341.
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may guarantee a right "to keep arms that could be taken up against tyranny
wherever found. ....
" Since Levinson is making assertions about constitutional
rights which presumably are to be enforced by courts, it is curious that he does
not ask the obvious threshold question about the insurrectionist theory. By what
standards are the courts to determine whether the government has become
sufficiently "tyrannical" so that armed insurrection becomes constitutionally
protected? If the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment is an "individual"
right, must not the courts defer to the judgment of the individual asserting the
right on the question of whether the government has become a tyranny? Surely
the right would be an empty one if it permitted governmental authority, in the
form of the courts, to substitute its judgment for that of the individual citizen on
the issue of whether the government had abused its power.
The logical extension of Levinson's position is that courts are powerless to
punish armed insurrection against the government as long as the revolutionaries
believe in good faith that the government had become a tyranny. Presumably,
this would mean that the government could not constitutionally prosecute persons
for shooting public officials, as long as the shooting was motivated by the belief
that the official was abusing his/her power. No one could deny that such a
doctrine would be a prescription for anarchy. Levinson must have sensed how
close he was coming to this view, for he takes pains to state: "I do not want to
argue that the state is necessarily tyrannical; I am not an anarchist." 6 He may
not regard himself as an anarchist, but if his constitutional theory guarantees to
each citizen the right to take up arms against the government if his/her
conscience so directs, anarchy appears to be a highly appropriate label for such
a state of affairs. Although the proper limit of government power to suppress
dissent in our society has always been a matter of robust debate in the courts,
the government's constitutional authority to preserve itself against violence has
remained unquestioned. As the Supreme Court wrote in Dennis v. United
States: 2 "We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of
preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion,
must lead to anarchy."'
Were the insurrectionist theory of the Second Amendment to be adopted by
the courts, surely much of our accepted First Amendment jurisprudence about
the limits of dissent would need radical revision. In Brandenburg v. Ohio,'
the Supreme Court ruled that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a State to forbid or prescribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or

61.
62.
63.
64.

Lcvinson, supra note 11, at 656.
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Id. at 501.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."'
While broadly protecting freedom of expression, Brandenburg
recognized that First Amendment freedoms do not extend to speech intended to
produce, and likely to produce, violent revolution. How can this continue to be
a valid limit on First Amendment freedom, if the Second Amendment guarantees
each individual the right to engage in armed revolution?"
Moreover, if the people are to be an effective armed force against tyranny,
then the Second Amendment also must guarantee their right to join together in
resisting the government. The insurrectionist theory therefore leads inexorably
to the assertion of a constitutional right to form private military forces. To get
some sense of the frightening consequences of such a right, the case of
Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass 'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,67 is instructive.
The case arose from the Ku Klux Klan's systematic and violent harassment
of Vietnamese fishermen along the Gulf Coast of Texas.
The plaintiff
organization sought to enjoin the activities of the Klan's Texas Emergency
Reserve (TER), the military arm of the Klan which operated training camps in
the State of Texas. The Court found that the Klan used the Reserve to train
individuals to intimidate the Vietnamese, who the Klan felt were unfairly
competing commercially with white fishermen.'
The Klan alleged that any injunction against its military activities would
violate the Second Amendment. It further argued that the Amendment rendered
unconstitutional the Texas statute providing that "no body of men, other than the
regularly organized state military forces of this State and the troops of the
United States, shall associate themselves together as a military company or
organization ...
."'
The Court rejected the Klan's argument, finding that "the Second Amendment
does not imply any general constitutional right for individuals to bear arms and
form private armies."'
It upheld the state law against private armies by
adopting the view that the Second Amendment protects only the keeping and

65. Id. at 447.
66. Indeed, if the insurrectionist theory is accepted, the entire First Amendment debate about
the limits of dissent becomes rather quaint. How can we seriously debate the right of an individual
to burn the American flag in protest over governmental policies, see United States v. Eichman, 110
S. Ct. 2404 (1990), when the Second Amendment gives that individual the right to bear arms against
the government?

67. 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
68. Id. at 206-07.
69. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5780 § 6 (West Supp. 1982), quoted in Vietnamese
Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 211 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
70. Vietnamese Fisherman'sAss'n, 543 F. Supp. at 210.
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bearing of arms that have some relationship to a government-sponsored militia,
finding that:
[D]efendants' military operations obviously have absolutely no
relationship whatsoever to any state or federal militia. In fact,
defendants pride themselves on the fact that the TER is an alternative
to Texas' state militia.7'
The Vietnamese Fishermen case poses a difficult question for Levinson: If
the Court had been guided by the insurrectionist theory, how could it have
enjoined the military activities of the Klan?
The definition of the
constitutionally-protected "militia" asserted by the Klan is identical to the
insurrectionist concept: a group of individuals bearing their private arms.
Perhaps Professor Levinson would argue that the Klan's intimidation of the
Vietnamese was not resistance against the government, and therefore not entitled
to Constitutional protection under his theory. But what if the Klan's military
camps were training individuals to threaten government officials charged with
implementing school desegregation, a policy which the Klan sincerely believed
to be the essence of tyranny? Surely the tolerance of private armies sponsored
by extremist groups cannot turn on whether the groups are prepared to use force
against government officials, as opposed to private individuals. The Vietnamese
Fishermen case illustrates the fundamental, real-world problem with the
insurrectionist theory. How does the theory permit the government to prevent
the formation and use of private armies by extremist groups, whether of the
right or of the left?
In rejecting the constitutional right to raise private armies, the opinion in
Vietnamese Fishermen relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Presser v.
Illinois. 2
Although Levinson notes Presser's holding that the Second
Amendment does not apply to the states, he does not seem to recognize that the
Court's opinion is wholly inconsistent with the insurrectionist theory. In Presser
the Court upheld, against Second Amendment challenge, an Illinois statute
barring the formation of private armies, which was similar to the Texas law
upheld in Vietnamese Fishermen. The Supreme Court wrote:
Military organization and military drill and parade under arms are
subjects especially under the control of the government of every
country . . . Under our political system they are subject to the

regulation and control of the State and Federal governments, acting in
due regard to their respective prerogatives and powers.'

71. Id. at 216.
72. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
73. Id. at 267.
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The Supreme Court's denunciation of private armies was echoed years later
by a New York court in Application of Cassidy:7'
There can be no justification for the organization of such an armed
force. Its existence would be incompatible with the fundamental
concept of our form of government. The inherent potential danger of
any organized private militia, even if never used or even if ultimately
placed at the disposal of the government, is obvious. Its existence
would be sufficient, without more, to prevent a democratic form of
government, such as ours, from functioning freely, without coercion,
and in accordance with the constitutional mandate.75
The seemingly uncontroversial principle of government control of military forces
is impossible to reconcile with the insurrectionist theory.
In addition, if the armed population is to be an effective check on the power
of government in this age of weapons of mass destruction, how can there be
limits on the kind of arms the people have the constitutional right to keep and
bear? If the Second Amendment guarantees the right to form effective private
military forces, it should also guarantee that individuals have the right to be
armed with weaponry that matches the destructive potential of the government's
arms. Indeed, the insurrectionist theory would dictate that the greater the
military utility of a weapon, the greater its constitutional protection. The
government would have more power to regulate single-shot rifles than to
regulate machine guns and bazookas.
One of the most peculiar aspects of Professor Levinson's argument is that
he does not appear at all repelled by such a conclusion. In his discussion of the
Supreme Court's refusal in United States v. Miller to accord constitutional
protection to a sawed-off shotgun, he places great emphasis on the Court's
finding that "it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the
ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common
defense." 6 Levinson reads this to mean that if a showing had been made of the
military utility of the shotgun, the Court might have accorded it constitutional
protection." Levinson concludes:
Ironically, Miller can be read to support some of the most extreme
anti-gun control arguments, e.g., that the individual citizen has a right
to keep and bear bazookas, rocket launchers, and other armaments that

74.
75.
76.
77.

51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944).
Id. at 205.
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178. Quoted in Levinson, supra note 11, at 654.
Levinson, supra note 11, at 654.
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are clearly relevant to modem warfare, including, of course, assault
weapons.
Arguments about the constitutional legitimacy of a
prohibition by Congress of private ownership of handguns or, what is
much more likely, assault rifles, might turn on the usefulness of such

guns in military settings.'
Thus, instead of concluding that a right to keep and bear bazookas is the
reductio ad absurdum of the insurrectionist interpretation of Miller, Levinson
appears to be comfortable with the possibility that this is exactly what the Court
meant. 9 If such a bizarre view of the Second Amendment seems divorced
from real courts and real cases, consider the fact that the National Rifle
Association and its lawyers have made the identical argument, invoking Miller,
to urge courts to strike down the 1986 federal machine gun ban," and the
California law banning possession and sale of semi-automatic military assault
weapons."2
If it is extremist and dangerous to admit to a generalized right to bear arms

78. Id.
79. There is no basis for reading Miller to grant constitutional protection to any weapon with
a military use. The issue in Miller turned on whether a sawed-off shotgun could be shown to have
"some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." Miller,
307 U.S. at 178. Simply because the Court held that the absence of evidence suggesting a military
utility for the gun precluded constitutional protection does not mean that such evidence would have
been sufficient to confer constitutional protection. Because the Court was able to decide the case
before it based on the nature of the weapon alone, it did not need to reach the further question
whether the circumstances of the weapon's possession by the particular defendant may preclude a
finding of its relationship to the well regulated militia. Nothing in Miller suggests that the Court
would confer constitutional protection on weapons of obvious military utility - such as machine guns
- insofar as they are possessed for reasons unconnected to service in an organized state militia.
80. In Farmerv. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041 (1 1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 753 (1991),
lawyers for the NRA's "Firearms Civil Rights Legal Defense Fund" represented a machine gun
manufacturer seeking to overturn the 1986 federal law banning possession and sale of new machine
guns. The Circuit Court rejected, without comment, the plaintiff's Second Amendment challenge
to the law. Plaintiff's unsuccessful petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court argued that Miller
grants constitutional protection to machine guns because of their military utility. Farmer,907 F.2d
1041 (11 th Cir. 1990), petidon for cer. (No. 90-600) (Copy on file with author).
81. In Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415 (E.D. Cal. 1990),
appealdocketed, No. 91-15466 (9th Cir. 1991), the NRA joined a suit charging that California's
Roberti-Roos Assault Weapon Control Act violates the Second Amendment. The district court
upheld the law. Plaintiffs' brief to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relies on Miller
for the proposition that all weapons with a conceivably military use are constitutionally protected.
Brief for Appellants, FresnoRifle & Pistol Club, (No. 91-15466) (Copy of brief on file with author).
Levinson says that "[i]t
is almost impossible to imagine that the judiciary would strike down a
determination by Congress that the possession of assault weapons should be denied to private
citizens." Levinson, supra note 11, at 655. Such a prospect would seem impossible only if the
courts are unwilling to take seriously the very theory which Levinson believes to deserve
consideration.
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against the government, is it not equally troubling to deny any right on the part
of the general population to rise up against tyranny? Are we really prepared to
deny the individual the right to engage in armed resistance against an
authoritarian government? Would we have denied the Jews in Nazi Germany
the right to resist their government by force of arms? Levinson himself invokes
the brutal suppression of Chinese students in Tianamen Square.' Regardless
of whether access to assault rifles would have made a practical difference in the
outcome of that confrontation, were we ready to deny such freedom-fighters the
right to organize themselves as an armed force against the Chinese government?
Regardless of how we answer these questions, we must first understand that
they are not questions of constitutional law. Indeed, the questions themselves
presuppose the end of constitutional government. Whether the Chinese students
had a right to bear arms against their government is not a question about what
rights are granted by the United States Constitution. If there is a right to resist
totalitarianism through violent resistance, its origin is extra-constitutional,
whether it be some notion of "natural law" or "moral rights."
Nowhere is the natural right of all persons to resist tyranny more eloquently
defended than in Jefferson's Declaration of Independence. To secure the right
to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," Jefferson wrote, "governments
are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed" and "whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it. .. ."
Jefferson, however, was not interpreting the Constitution; he was appealing
to the natural right of persons to establish constitutional government. It is surely
significant that his immortal call to revolution is not duplicated in the text of the

Constitution. The constitutional authors realized that were this natural right to
become a constitutional right, the constitutional system itself would be
threatened. A constitutional right in our system is, by definition, a limitation
on the power of the democratically elected majority. To the extent that the right
to be armed against the government is a constitutional right, it must operate to
restrain the power of that majority to prevent armed insurrection. Once
democratic government is stripped of that power, it is stripped of the power to
protect all of our other liberties. It is as true as it is ironic that, although a
natural right to revolution may have been necessary to achieve constitutional
government, it cannot be a principle of constitutional government.
In short, the existence of a constitutional right to use arms against tyranny
would, itself, create the conditions for tyranny. As Dean Roscoe Pound wrote,

82. Levinson, supra note 11, at 656.
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"in the urban industrial society of today a general right to bear efficient arms
so as to be enabled to resist oppression by the government would mean that
gangs could exercise an extra-legal rule which would defeat the whole Bill of
Rights. "8' This is the insurrectionist vision of America.
VI.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Unlike the Declaration of Independence, our Constitution is not a charter
for revolution; it is a charter for government. The Constitution establishes a
system of democratic institutions and instructs us that, if the system is carefully
protected, liberty will be ensured. It does not address the question of the
individual's rights against tyranny because its only subject matter is the creation
of democratic institutions to ensure against tyranny. One can believe in a
natural right to resist tyranny by force of arms without conceding that a
democratic government is powerless to prevent insurrection or to regulate
privately-owned firearms.
As important as the gun control controversy is, there is far more at stake
in the Second Amendment debate than whether a waiting period for handguns
or a prohibition of assault weapons is constitutional. The insurrectionist
theorists like Levinson have upped the ante. They are posing one of the
fundamental questions of American government: What is the origin of our
liberty under the Constitution? If the courts are prepared to follow the
insurrectionists to the conclusion that constitutional liberty ultimately comes from
the barrel of a gun, the Second Amendment may prove to be a weapon of
destruction aimed at the rest of the Bill of Rights.

83. RoscoE POUND, THE DEvEoPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GuARANTEEs

(1957).
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